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The recently identified human infections with avian 
influenza A(H7N9) viruses in China raise impor-
tant questions regarding possible source and risk 
to humans. Sequence comparison with an influenza 
A(H7N7) outbreak in the Netherlands in 2003 and an 
A(H7N1) epidemic in Italy in 1999–2000 suggests  that 
widespread circulation of A(H7N9) viruses must have 
occurred in China. The emergence of human adapta-
tion marker PB2 E627K in human A(H7N9) cases par-
allels that of the fatal A(H7N7) human case in the 
Netherlands.
Background 
Since 31 March 2013, Chinese health authorities have 
been reporting human cases of avian influenza A(H7N9) 
virus infections. This novel reassortant influenza virus, 
carrying six internal gene segments of poultry A(H9N2) 
viruses, supplemented with a haemagglutinin (HA) sub-
type 7 and a neuraminidase (NA) subtype 9 originating 
from wild birds [1,2], has caused infections in at least 
82 persons, of whom 17 have died, as of 17 April  2013. 
The human infections occurred in eastern China in four 
provinces (Henan, Anhui, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang) and 
two municipalities (Shanghai and Beijing). Currently, 
the source of the human infections is unclear. However, 
in response to the detection of the influenza A(H7N9) 
virus among chickens, pigeons, ducks and envi-
ronmental samples from some animal markets, as 
reported to the World Organisation for Animal Health 
(OIE), Chinese authorities have suspended live poultry 
trade and implemented the immediate closure of poul-
try markets, launched road inspections for transport 
of poultry, and have culled birds in an effort to deal 
with the issue. The outbreak raises important ques-
tions regarding possible source and risk to humans, 
and these will be addressed through case investiga-
tions. Here, we compare some findings from the first 
two weeks of the outbreak with those from a large 
highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H7N7) virus 
outbreak in the Netherlands in 2003 and from a low 
pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) A(H7N1) epidemic 
in Italy in 1999–2000 [3-5] and discuss issues related 
to diagnosis and the use of molecular surveillance to 
monitor the outbreak.
Influenza A(H7N7) outbreak in 
the Netherlands in 2003
Exactly 10 years ago, the Netherlands was struck by an 
HPAI A(H7N7) virus outbreak that resulted in the infec-
tion of poultry on 255 farms and the subsequent cull-
ing of about 30 million chickens. A total of 453 exposed 
persons had mild symptoms and were investigated, 
of whom 89 were laboratory-confirmed as having an 
A(H7N7) virus infection [6,7].
Diagnosis of influenza 
A(H7Nx) virus infection
During the HPAI A(H7N7) virus outbreak in the 
Netherlands, almost all human cases had mild symp-
toms, particularly conjunctivitis, but one veterinarian 
died after an episode of severe influenza-like illness 
complicated by acute respiratory distress syndrome 
(ARDS) [7] . Diagnosis was based on virus detection 
by reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction 
(RT-PCR) from eye swabs, or combined nose and throat 
swabs.  An important observation was that the sensi-
tivity of eye swab-based diagnostics was much higher 
than that of diagnostics based on combined nose and 
throat swabs [6,7]. Similarly, in later sporadic infec-
tions of humans with H7 influenza A viruses, ocular 
symptoms were observed, probably caused by a pref-
erence of H7 influenza viruses for receptors in the eye 
[8]. Studies have shown that H7 influenza viruses may 
use the ocular mucosa as portal of entry for systemic 
infection and that this is strain dependent [9,10]. Such 
symptoms have not been described for the cases of 
A(H7N9) virus infection in China in 2013, but it may be 
important to actively monitor for conjunctivitis in the 
outbreak investigation, as it may increase the success 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Serological surveillance is important to rule out infec-
tion in patients sampled too late for direct virus detec-
tion and to assess the extent of transmission. This 
may be a problem since serological responses in per-
sons with confirmed influenza A(H7Nx) virus infection 
have been difficult to detect, making assessment of 
A(H7N9) virus exposure using serosurveys challenging 
[11,12]. However, determining the kinetics of the anti-
body response in confirmed cases of influenza A(H7N9) 
virus infection will provide important information that 
can inform public health action.
Comparative analysis based 
on virus sequencing
Detecting the novel virus in animals is challenging as 
the A(H7N9) virus is a LPAI virus that is expected to 
cause few or no signs of disease in poultry, allowing 
silent spread among poultry flocks. The sharing of 
influenza A(H7N9) virus sequence data by both Chinese 
veterinary and public health institutes through the 
Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID) 
allows comparison with the sequences obtained dur-
ing the Dutch outbreak. We therefore performed a 
comparative analysis using HA, NA and PB2 (subunit 
of the influenza virus RNA polymerase complex) frag-
ment sequences from Chinese A(H7N9) viruses in 2013, 
Dutch A(H7N7) viruses in 2003 and sequences from a 
well-described LPAI A(H7N1) epidemic in Italy in 1999–
2000 [5]. Providers of sequences downloaded from 
GISAID, listed with accession numbers, are acknowl-
edged in the Table.
Sequence analysis of the Dutch viruses detected in 
poultry and in humans showed rapid diversification of 
the outbreak strain into multiple lineages (Figure). On 
the basis of the combined epidemiological and labora-
tory analyses, we demonstrated that sequences from 
humans were positioned mostly at ends of the branches 
of minimal spanning  trees,  confirming that humans 
were probably not involved in onward transmission [3]. 
In the current study, we compared the sequence diver-
sity observed during the Dutch A(H7N7) outbreak and 
Italian A(H7N1) epidemic with the initial A(H7N9) virus 
sequences from the current outbreak in China. The 
maximum genetic distance generated during the three 
months of the Dutch HPAI A(H7N7) outbreak in concat-
enated HA, NA and PB2 segments of A(H7N7) viruses 
was 25 nucleotide substitutions. For the Italian LPAI 
A(H7N1) epidemic, the distance generated during a 
nine-month period was 66 nucleotide substitutions. 
For the A(H7N9) outbreak strains, this genetic distance 
is 35 substitutions, or 21 substitutions when the outlier 
strain A/Shanghai/1/2013 is ignored (Figure).
All (n=7) NA sequences of the A(H7N9) viruses are 
characterised by a deletion in the stalk region, asso-
ciated with adaptation to gallinaceous hosts [1,2,13]. 
Similar deletions in the NA stalk were also observed 
during the A(H7N7) outbreak in the Netherlands and 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sequence diversity present in initial A(H7N9) virus 
sequences, compared with that of the Dutch HPAI 
A(H7N7) and Italian LPAI A(H7N1) outbreak strains, and 
the large geographical area affected, the data are sug-
gestive of (silent) spread and adaptation in domestic 
animals before the novel A(H7N9) virus was identified 
in humans.
Human adaptation markers
The majority of the Dutch human cases of A(H7N7) 
virus infection had mild symptoms, with the exception 
of one fatal case who was diagnosed with an A(H7N7) 
virus with the mammalian adaptation marker PB2 
E627K. This mutation most probably occurred during 
infection of this case and was associated with high vir-
ulence [14]. Remarkably, the PB2 segments of the four 
available human virus genome sequences from China 
all carry this E627K substitution, which is absent in the 
virus isolates obtained from birds and the environment 
[2]. In addition, three of the four infections with the 
virus with PB2 E627K were fatal. There are two plausi-
ble explanations for this observation: 
1.  the mammalian adaptation markers are 
selected during replication in humans follow-
ing exposure to viruses that do not have this 
mutation, which are circulating in animals; 
2.  the mammalian adaptation markers result from 
virus replication in animals from which humans 
become infected. 
Figure
Genetic diversity of three influenza A(H7Nx) virus outbreaks expressed by minimum spanning trees 
HPAI: highly pathogenic avian influenza; LPAI: low pathogenic avian influenza. 
The minimum spanning trees were constructed using concatenated haemagglutinin, neuraminidase and PB2 (subunit of the influenza 
virus RNA polymerase complex) nucleotide sequences in BioNumerics software version 6.6.4. The scaling of the branches, representing 
nucleotide substitutions, is equal for the three outbreaks.  
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The relatively protracted disease course in the current 
outbreak of A(H7N9) virus infection, with relatively 
mild symptoms at first, followed by exacerbation in the 
course of a week or longer, is suggestive of the first 
hypothesis, similar to the outbreak in the Netherlands. 
In this scenario, an important difference in the A(H7N7) 
observations from the Netherlands is the frequency 
of finding the PB2 E627K  mutation in humans (4/4 
A(H7N9) sequenced patient strains compared with 1/61 
sequenced A(H7N7) patient strains). Therefore, an out-
standing question is whether the A(H7N9) viruses are 
more readily mutating in humans or milder cases are 
being missed. Contact investigations have found no 
mild cases and only one asymptomatic case), but in 
order to address this issue, more enhanced testing of 
persons exposed to a similar source is needed, using 
the most sensitive tests available on the optimal clini-
cal specimen type obtained at the right time. 
Although human infections with H7 influenza viruses 
have occurred repeatedly over the last decades without 
evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission, 
the absence of sustained human-to-human transmis-
sion of A(H7N9) viruses does not come with any guar-
antee. Five of seven A(H7N9) virus strains obtained 
from humans (n=2), birds (n=2) and the environment 
(n=1) have a mutation in HA, Q226L, that is associated 
with binding to alpha(2,6)-linked sialic acids, the virus 
receptors in the human upper respiratory tract [2]. This 
Q226L substitution in combination with G228S has 
been associated with human receptor preference for 
influenza viruses that caused the pandemics of 1957 
and 1968 and with airborne transmission of A(H5N1) 
virus [15,16]. For H7 viruses, it has recently been dem-
onstrated that these mutations also increased human 
receptor-binding affinity [17]. In combination with the 
PB2 E627K mutation, the A(H7N9) virus thus contains 
two well-known mammalian adaptation markers. 
Conclusion 
Comparative analysis of the first virological findings 
from the current outbreak of influenza A(H7N9) virus 
infection in China with those from other influenza 
A(H7Nx) outbreaks suggests that widespread circula-
tion must have occurred, resulting in major genetic 
diversification. Such diversification is of concern, 
given that several markers associated with increased 
risk for public health are already present. Enhanced 
monitoring of avian and mammalian animal reservoirs 
is of utmost importance as the public health risk of 
these A(H7N9) viruses may change following limited 
additional modification.
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